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III. REFERENCES AND CITATIONS
References and citations in this brief shall have the following abbreviations:
The record of court's file on appeal - AR (Appellate Record)
Transcript of hearing on August 26, 2002- Appendix - App
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - URCP, and
Utah Code Annotated- UCA
Exhibits --Ex
Thus a citation to the November 12, 1998 hearing which is numbered as filed on
page 1954 in the Appeal Record and is reproduced in the Appendix will be - AR 1954,
App, p , and lines
)
IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
1. Judgment or Order: This appeal seeks review of the amended judgment and
order of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable William
B. Bohling, dated and entered on October 8,2002. No motions pursuant to the Rules 50 (a)
and (b), 52 (b), 54 (b) or 59 of the Utah Rules of Procedure (URCP) have been filed. A
motion to extend the time of filing of the appeal for thirty (30) days was filed and granted on
November 20, 2002.
2. Jurisdiction: This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) which confers jurisdiction on this Court to hear appeals
from District Court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce,
annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity.

V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This appeal presents the following issues:
1. The trial court dismissed the respondent's Counter-petition to modify the Decree

of Divorce for purposes of child support. Did the Court err in dismissing the Respondent's
Counter-petition, ruling that respondent's claim for modification of the child support did not
survive the deeith of the petitioner? (Order dated October 8, 2003-AR, p 1939)
2.

Did the Court err or abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's Motion To

Substitute the personal representative of petitioner's estate as a party in the divorce case
where the motion for substitution came more than 90 days after a notice of death of the
petitioner was filed in the case? (AR 1939, 1954, App, p. 17, lines 21-25)
3. Did the District Court err in not making factual findings to support the dismissal
of respondent's Counter-petition?

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCE, RULES AND
REGULATIONS
1. 30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and
children - Division of debts - Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and
parent-time - Determination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for
modification.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new
orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health,
and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts
as is reasonable and necessary.
2. Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure, Rule 25. Substitution of parties.
(a) Death
(a)(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
2

in JIV i »i i ki substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may
be made by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased
party and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as
provide in Rule 5 and upon peisons noi |Miiu^ m ik* maniu'i p^n nk'd m I • • 11 <
4 lui Ilic vi \ »i *" of a summons. Unless the motion for substitution is made not
later than ninety days after the death is suggested upon the record by service
of a statement of the fact of the death as provided herein for the service nl Itti
motion, (tie nclimi (nil !»** dismissed \\» lo "I'M "It i <"»*cd pafi>
3, Rule 6. Time
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice thereunder or by order
of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at oi within a spec i lied
-• time tlic i mill vulli / ,mst sJi-'vui iii.ii11, ,il JII1, linn in »( ilisi irlioii I I I w illi ,jr
without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made
before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a
previous order or (2) upon a motion made after the expiration of the spec i lied
tiini pumil 1111 „ii( fi Ir 'Ic'fir when1 llir liiiluic In .n I mis (IK; ivsult of
excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action under
Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b), except to the extent and
under the conditions stated in them.

3

VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of The Case.
The parties were divorced in 1989. The Decree awarded the respondent sole custody,
care and control of the parties' two minor children and ordered the petitioner to pay the
respondent child support in the amount of $226.00 a month per child. (AR, pp 53, 69 & 75).
In January 1998, the petitioner brought a petition to modify the decree of divorce to change
custody of the oldest childfromthe respondent to petitioner because, at the time, the oldest
child left to reside with the petitioner. At the same time petitioner obtained an exparte
protective order which was dismissed at the hearing. In February 1998, the respondent filed
a counter-petition to modify the decree and increase the amount of child support paid to her
by the petitioner.
The petitioner's motion to modify quickly became moot and was dropped because the
child returned to live with the respondent. The petitioner filed another Petition to Modify
the Decree of Divorce in July or August 2000, and obtained another exparte protective order.
However, the petition was not properly served and became moot as to the oldest daughter
because she became emancipated shortly after. The petitioner never attempted to prosecute
the petition after it was filed and after the accompanying exparte Protective Order was
dismissed at the first hearing thereon.
Respondent proceeded and conducted discovery consisting of interrogatories and
requests for production of documents, the taking of depositions, and the use of subpoenas to
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obtain records of petitioner's income under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (hereinafter
URCP) 30, 335 34 and 45.
For the next two and one half years a number of motions were filed by tlic potMumei
..IIMI ll^i

(ittilii's « 'i i\ in ("OIIS;(JIK( inn "ilii ii ()!>ti1i( c Ivfoiv Mh i onrl \'\ iiiii motions and objections.

The petitioner died of brain cancer on August 29, 2001, five days after the court entered an
order pertaining to the last round of objections filed by petitioner's attorney (AR1860).
The counter petition of the respondent was' tie v ei 1 ic ai dpi ioi tothepe t itioner s death
of \ i igust 29, 2001 , becai ise tl ie case v\ as continually meshed in motions for temporary
orders, orders to show cause, and objections to rulings of the Commissioner and the form of
court orders, which were primarily brought by the petitioner For Commissioner Thomas
Arnett's personal summary of the .t-en .A K
of 1 1 ii i G

IIIII nissi< >ner dated

Februan :8, 2uu0, ^Ak i J i i-1314) and August 18, 2000. (AR

1429-1432)
After the death of the petitioner, his counsel of record filed a Notice Of Termination
Of Jurisdiction because of peliduiici s diMilli

llic n spoiiilnil lili'd a tqnlh oh|i:i lini> In ,)in,

dismissal because she had stated a cause of action in her counter-petition that survived the
petitioner's death.
The respondent thereafter attempted to have a personal representative appointed (i > 111 v
pohlniiK,r,sAk,i.uli,(il *. i stain

Win ii ii

1M

inn

OIMIIMI

lliiinl iln nidn i«lii,il

MIIMIMI IIIII

ilii

petitioner's/decedent's Last Will and Testament, Kathy Seich, did not intend to probate the
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will, respondent filed an application for appointment of herself as personal representative
on behalf of her minor son R. Jacob Owens (Third District Probate No 013901596). A
hearing was held on respondent's application in December 2001, and in April 2002, an order
appointing the personal representative was finally issued. In April 2002, shortly after the
appointment of the personal representative, the respondent filed a motion in this case to
substitute the appointed personal representative as the party-plaintiff/petitioner with the
purpose and intent of proceeding with her counter-petition for modification of the child
support.
In September 2002, the assigned judge, the Honorable William B. Bohling, denied
respondent's substitution of parties because it was not brought under Rule 25 of the URCP
within 90 days after notice of death on the record. The Court dismissed the Counter-petition,
ruling that the death of the petitioner extinguished the divorce action and any claim of the
respondent therein.
B. Statement of Relevant Facts
1. Among other things, the Decree of Divorce awarded the Respondent sole custody,
control and care of the parties' two minor children along with child support of $226.00 per
month per child. (AR, 55 & 75)
2. On or about January 28, 1998, the petitioner brought a petition to modify the
decree of divorce to change custody of the oldest child from the respondent to petitioner. (AR
504)
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Februar

' 7: 1998, the respondent answered the petition (AR, 553) and on

March i>-, 1998, filed a counter petition to modify the decree and increase the amount of
child support paid to her by the petitioner. (AR 597) The counter petition was served on the
petitioner on February i)\ iw*s (, \,i\ <>uU)
q

- • spondent conducted discovery consisting of interrogatories and requests for

production of documents, the taking of depositions, and use of subpoenas to obtain
documents of pay and income of the petitioner under U.R.C.P. in ordei to be prepared for
trial on her counter-petition.
( AR 899, 966 980)
5. However, no certification for hearing, under the rules and policies of the district
court, could be filed because of the constant filing of motions and objections to
recommendations .'i"il Ibr Innn nil nulns

! iir JIM1 la il ami facts stl loiili nuclei hi'ihlinj1, of

"Motions and Responses of Parties After Filing of Respondent's Counter-petition", Infra.
6. On February 12, 2001 respondent filed a verified motion to amend her counterpetition, (AR 1785) and on May I, 200II, after the recommendation of the Commissioner,
respninli'Ml 111 LiiIn mini ;11m mji/il i mnilct -prfitiun

i Ah! IN \ U IVhniuici iml/'ul iiiii uh|n nun

thereto.
7. On August 29, 2001, petitioner passed away, only five days after the entry of the
court's order, following the last round of objections filed by petitioner s attorney
alhnvul llir n spuinh ill . iiimiiilnit mil In In i rniinln -)H IIIIUII I \\f IKi'ill)
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The court

8.

On September 7, 2001, petitioner's counsel, Ephraim Fankhauser, filed a

document entitled Notice of Termination of Jurisdiction, based upon petitioner's untimely
death. (AR 1866)
9.

Respondent, on October 24, 2001, filed an Application For Adjudication of

Intestacy and For Appointment of Personal Representative as the legal guardian of the minor
son R. Jacob Owens. {In The Matter of The Estate of Robert J. Owens, Third District Court
Probate No. 013901596)
10. On November 13, 2001, Kathy Lee Seich filed an objection to the appointment
of the respondent as personal representative of Robert Owens' Estate. {Id.)
11. On about November 28,2001, Respondent filed a Verified Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order against dissipation of estate assets, pending the resolution of the objection
of Kathy Seich {Id.)
12.

On about December 13, 2001, Kathy Seich filed a response objecting to

respondent's motion for a restraining order and sought to be appointed the personal
representative of the estate of petitioner/decedent, Robert J. Owens. {Id.)
13. On December 20, 2001, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston heard and denied
respondent's application for appointment and ruled that Kathy Lee Seich be appointed as
personal representative of the estate of Robert Owens. Pursuant to the stipulation of the
parties the honorable judge issued a preliminary injunction against dissipation of any
personal property and real property of the estate upon which the petitioner /decedent was
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living at the time of his death. (Id)
14. The Third District Probate Court entered an order on April 4, 2002, appointing
Kathy Lee Seich as the personal representative of the estate of the late Robert J. Owens. (Id.)
15. On April 24, 2002, respondent filed and served a Motion For Substitution of
Party in this case on Kathy Lee Seich, who had been appointed as the personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert J. Owens. (AR 1889) l
16. On May 15,2002, Kathy Seich, Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert
J. Owens, filed a motion to dismiss the case based upon the respondent's failure to move for
substitution of party within 90 days of the Notice of Termination of Jurisdiction filed by
petitioner's counsel, Ephraim Fankhauser. Also, Kathy Seich believed that petitioner's
passing terminated the action. (AR 1889)
17.

On July 15, 2002, the motions to substitute and to dismiss were heard by

Commissioner Bradford, whom ruled that the action was abated with the death of the
petitioner and recommended that the action be dismissed on that basis. (AR 1929)
18. Respondent objected to the recommendation of the Commissioner, which
objection was heard by the Honorable Judge William Bohling on August 20, 2002. The
Judge ruled and ordered that the Motion To Substitute Parties be denied because it was not

i

The date stamp of the clerk shows the motion & memorandum to substitute to have beenfiledon
May 20, 2002. Apparently, because of an inadvertent mis-numbering of the case, the clerk did not
find the file and did not stamp the motion until that date. The copy of the motion attached as
exhibits to the motion of Kathy Seich to dismiss the action shows they were received by her or her
attorney on April 25, 2002. (AR 1877, 1889 & 1882)
9

brought within 90 days of a suggestion on the record of death of the petitioner, and that the
action be dismissed because respondent's claim did not survive the petitioner's death. (AR
1932) An order dismissing the action was entered on September 13, 2002. (AR1932)
19. In the interim, on September 10, 2002, respondent had filed an objection to the
form of the order and Amended Order dismissing the action was entered on October 8,2002.
(AR 1935-38) Respondent appeals from that order.
20. On November 6, 2002, respondent filed an Exparte Motion For Extension Of
Time To File Notice of Appeal. (AR 1938) On November 21, 2002, the Court entered an
order granting respondent a 30 day extension in which to file her notice of appeal. (AR
1939)
21. On December 9, 2002, respondent filed her Notice of Appeal. (AR1942)
C. Facts Relating to Motions and Responses of Parties
After Filing of Respondent's Counter-petition
a. On about January 28, 1998, new counsel appeared for the petitioner and
immediately filed a verified motion for orders along with the petition to modify the
decree of divorce, seeking among other things a temporary change of custody of the
oldest minor child. (AR 511)
b.

At about this same time, the petitioner filed a verified petition for a

protective order alleging abuse of the parties' daughter by the respondent.
c.

On February 12, 1998, the petitioner served by mail his First Set of 50

Interrogatories, which together with sub parts, consisted of 165 interrogatories. At
10

the same time he served a Request For Production of Documents consisting of eight
different broad categories of documents. (AR 578-596) The interrogatories and
requests were not tailored to the facts of the case and were onerous and overly
burdensome and required undue expense in order to respond. Respondent objected
and filed for a protective order from the court. (AR 574)
d. At a hearing on petitioner's motion for orders on March 4, 1998, the
Honorable Commissioner recommended denial of a temporary custody of the children
and ordered that a custody evaluation be performed with the petitioner to bear the
initial expense pending trail. (AR 571) Petitioner never obtained a custody evaluation.
e. At a hearing on February 10, 1998, the Honorable Commissioner denied
petitioner's petition for a protective order, commenting that it was not appropriate to
file a petition for a protective order for the mere purpose of effecting a change in
custody. (AR 536)
f On May 15, 1998, petitioner propounded his Second set of Interrogatories
and
Request for Production of Documents, to which respondent responded in June 1998.
(AR

)
g. On November 13,1998, respondent served Interrogatories and Request for

Production of Documents upon the petitioner. (AR 709) Petitioner responded to
respondent's discovery requests in March 1999.

11

h. From December 1997, through January 1999, respondent was forced to
garnish petitioner's wages at Kennecott Copper Corporation in order to collect
judgments for child support arrearages, for medical expenses, and for attorney's fees.
(AR 683-701, 706-708, 710-715, 738-740, 781-786)
i. On March 23, 1999, respondent supplemented her answers and responses
to petitioner's interrogatories and request for production o f documents. (AR 815)
j On July 21,1999, petitioner once again filed a petition to modify the decree
of divorce to obtain custody of the minor children. (AR 856)
k. On July 28, 1999, petitioner filed another motion for orders seeking
temporary custody of the parties' minor daughter. (AR 882)
1. In connection with the petition for modification and the motion for orders,
petitioner obtained another exparte protective order against respondent for child abuse
which was dismissed upon hearing the petition. (AR 916-17 ). The Court granted
the petitioner's motion for temporary custody of the minor daughter, after serious
objection of the respondent out of concern for her daughter's moral, emotional, and
educational well being and stability. The recommendation of the Commissioner was
approved by the Court on November 2, 1999. (AR 956, 959)
m. On September 17,1999, respondent noticed up the deposition of Kennecott
Copper Corporation, by which she obtained petitioner's employment and
compensation records. (AR 966)

12

n. On December 3, 1999, petitioner filed another verified motion for orders
to recover child support withheld by the Office of Recovery Services, and to abate his
child support for July August 1999, wherein the parties minor daughter had left the
home of the respondent. (AR 993-998)
o. On December 28, 1999, respondent filed a Verified Response and Motion
to terminate her obligation of child support for the daughter who had reached the age
of majority, was not living with the petitioner, and was-not attending high school full
time, as well as a claim for medical expenses. (AR 999-1004) Hearing was scheduled
for January 4, 2000.
p. On January 4, 2000, the Honorable Commissioner took the matter under
advisement because the file was not available. (AR 1009-10)
q. On February 14, 2000, petitioner filed another Motion For Orders
(Verified) seeking additional medical expenses and attorney's fees. (AR 1289)
r. On February 24, 2000, the Honorable Commissioner, Thomas N. Arnett,
issued an extensive minute entry in which he denied petitioner's motion(s) and
granted the respondent's motion for medical expenses and attorney's fees. (AR 13111313) In his minute entry, Commissioner Arnett, after an extensive review of the
record, characterized most of the litigation in the case as being the result of a
fraudulent judgment which the petitioner obtained against the respondent, and his
failure to comply with the court's orders (judgments) for his failure to pay child

13

support and medical expenses.
s. On March 2,2000 the Commissioner heard and took under advisement the
February 14, 2000 Motion for Orders of the petitioner.
t.

On March 6, 2000, the petitioner filed an Objection to Commissioner

Arnett's Recommendation and requested oral argument. (AR 1351)
u. On March 29,2000, the Commissioner heard respondent's December 1998
Motion For Orders to terminate child support for Shiloh Owens and to resume
payment of child support for Jacob Owens and took the motion under advisement.
v. Also, on March 29, 2000, respondent served her Responses to Petitioner's
Third Set of Interrogatories and Request For Production of Documents. (AR 1392)
w. On April 19, 2000, counsel for the petitioner, Stephen Cook, withdrew,
(AR 1393) and on May 12, 2000, respondent served a notice to appoint counsel or
appear prose. (AR1399)
x. On June 2, 2000, new counsel, Rex Bushman, appeared for the petitioner
and the Honorable Judge heard petitioner's objections to recommendation. At that
hearing the petitioner stipulated to withdraw his objection to the Commissioner's
Februaty 24, 2000 recommendation and to the form of the order. The respondent
stipulated to add the minor son, Jacob Owens, to her husband's medical insurance in
September 2000, and cover all future medical expenses for Jacob thereafter. (AR
1410-1413)
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y. On August 2, 2000, the parties entered into a stipulation to file copies of
documents and pleadings for the clerk's file because the original file was lost. (AR
1419-20)
z. On August 18, 2000, Commissioner Arnett issued a minute entry dealing
with issues taken under advisement in two previous hearings, The Commissioner
recommended that child support for Shiloh be terminated and that support for Jacob
be resumed as moved by respondent. (AR 1429-1432)
aa. The Honorable Judge Bohling held a hearing on remand from the previous
appeal on August 24,2000 and scheduled closing arguments for September 18,2000.
(AR 1435-38)
bb. The Court heard closing arguments on September 18, 2000 and adjusted
the former judgment of attorney's fees on behalf of the respondent to $3,000.00.
cc. Thereafter, from September 27,2000, through October 23,2000, the court
dealt with petitioner's objection to the recommendation of the Commissioner. The
Order on the Commissioner's recommendations was entered by the Court on October
23, 2000. (AR 1567)
dd. Counsel for the petitioner, Rex Bushman, withdrew on October 21,2000,
and former counsel, Ephraim Fankhauser, re-entered his appearance on October 26,
2000. (AR 1563-1565)
ee. Immediately after his entry of appearance, counsel continued the hearing

15

of petitioner's Order to Show Cause noticed by previous counsel. (AR 1570)
ff. On November 20, 2000,

the Court issued a Minute Entry Decision

denying
petitioner's motion to extend time to object and awarded respondent Attorney's fees.
gg. On December 1, 2000, petitioner filed another Memorandum in Support
of his Motion and Order To Show Cause with extensive documentation seeking
alleged overpaid child support. (AR 1575-1595) Petitioner noticed a hearing thereon
for December 13, 2000. (AR1596)
hh. On December 12, 2000, respondent filed a Verified Motion and obtained
an Order To Show Cause why petitioner should not be ordered to pay child support
which the Court had ordered on October 25, 2000, and why the Court should not
modify the Child support provision of the Decree of Divorce. (AR 1601 -1619)
ii.

Also, on December 12, 2000, respondent responded to petitioner's

memorandum in support of his motion for order to show cause, and further moved for
sanctions under Rule 11 of the URCP against petitioner and his attorney for asserting
matters in his order to show cause that were already resolved in previous orders. (AR
1674-1704)
jj. At the hearing noticed by petitioner on December 13, 2000, petitioner
moved to recuse the Honorable Commissioner Thomas Arnett on the basis of bias.
Out of courtesy, the Commissioner recused himself and bowed out of the case. The
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case was reset for hearing on January 10,2001, before a different commissioner. (AR
1708)
kk. On December 18, 2000, petitioner, through his counsel, withdrew his
claim for abatement of child support for the minor daughter Shiloh for the months of
July and August 1999, and corrected the Order To Show Cause in order to moot and
evade the respondent's motion for Rule 11 sanctions. Petitioner noticed hearing on
his Order To Show Cause for January 10, 2001. (AR 1713-1715)
11. On December 19, 2000, unaware of petitioner's scheduling of a January
10, 2001, hearing, respondent noticed her Order To Show Cause for hearing on
January 4, 2001. (AR 1718)
mm. After hearing the respective Orders To Show Cause of both parties, the
Honorable Commissioner, Susan Bradford, among other things, awarded the
petitioner a credit of $904.00 child support, previously collected by ORS, and
$1,500.00 for a reduction in attorney's fees adjusted at the hearing on remand from
a judgment issued in May 1998. The commissioner reserved an increase of child
support sought by the respondent for trial on the counterclaim for modification and
gave respondent a judgment of child support arrearage in the amount of $452, and
ordered that an order to withhold from wages should be issued if the petitioner
became 30 days behind in his support payments. Attorney's fees by both parties were
denied. The commissioner gave the parties 30 days in which to exchange financial
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information and certified all issues for trial. (AR 1744-45)
nn.

The petitioner objected to the Commissioner's recommendation, and

respondent objected to the petitioner's editorialization and mis-characterization of the
Commissioner's recommendation in the form of the order. The form and content of
the order were not resolved until April 16, 2001 when the Court issued an order
overruling the recommendation of the Commissioner, reserving consideration of the
dispute over $226.00 child support for August 1999, but paid in September, thus
reducing the child support arrearage owed by petitioner from $452.00 to $226.00.
The judge denied the objections of the petitioner and upheld the recommendation of
the Commissioner in all other respects. (AR 1806-1812)
oo. On April 17, 2001 the Judge issued an order upholding the objections
of the respondent to the form of the order. (AR 1813-1816)
pp. In the interim, on February 3,2001, respondent filed a Motion For Leave
to Amend Counter-petition with supporting memorandum (AR 1786 -1793) to which
petitioner objected and responded. (AR 1817-1826)
qq. After hearing, on April 23, 2001, Commissioner Bradford recommended
that respondent be granted leave to file an amended counter-petition and on May 1,
2001,

Respondent filed her Amended Counter-petition. (AR 1832-1833)
rr. On May 10,2001, petitioner responded to the Amended Counter-petition,

(AR 1841-1849) and on June 21, 2001 objected to the form of the order. (AR1846-
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1852)
ss. On August 15, 2001, the Commissioner recommended the form of the
Order with slight modification, and on August 24,2001, the Court signed and entered
the order. (AR 1860-1862)
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. Respondent's Claim Survived Death Of The Petitioner.
The lower court held that the respondent's Amended Counter-petition To Modify
Decree of Divorce did not survive the death of the petitioner because his death extinguished
the divorce action. The Courts of this State have proceeded with many varied and different
types of action against an estate after a party died and after the divorce had been granted,
including the enforcement of child support.
In the Owens case the divorce was granted (1989). The respondent's counter-petition
asserts a cause of action that existed prior to the death of Robert Owens because of his
intentional failure to report his income and to pay child support in accordance with the state
child support guidelines. The cause of action arose out of the misconduct of Robert Owens
while he was alive. It would be unjust not to consider the entitlement of the respondent
under the decree of divorce which was made difficult, if not impossible, to conclude while
the petitioner was alive because of the actions directly attributed to petitioner.
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2. The Court for Excusable Neglect Can Extend the Time For Filing a Motion To
Substitute A Party After The Expiration of 90 days After Suggestion of Death
On Record.
The district court denied the respondent's motion to substitute the Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert J. Owens as a party to this action because it was not
brought within 90 days of the filing of the Notice of Termination of Jurisdiction on the
record. The Utah Supreme Court has stated in dicta that an enlargement of time can be
granted to file a motion for substitution under rule 25(a) even after the 90 day period has
expired upon a showing of excusable neglect. The Utah position in accord with cases
construing rule 25(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where the motion to substitute
was filed more than 90 days after a suggestion of death on the record, and excusable neglect
was shown for not filing the motion within the 90 day period. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
are patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Rule 25(a) appears to be
word for word the same as Federal Rule 25(a). The district court should have exercised its
discretion to grant an enlargement of time for respondent to file the motion to substitute in
this case, even after the 90 day period had expired, based upon the showing of excusable
neglect.
IX. ARGUMENT
Essentially this appeal involves two issues: 1) whether the respondent's counterpetition survived the death of Robert Owens' death and, 2) whether the respondent showed
excusable neglect for failing tofileher motion for substitution of the personal representative
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of the Estate of Robert Owens as a party within 90 days of a suggestion of death on the
record?
1. Standard of Review
The district court's dismissal of the respondent's (appellant's) counter-petition is an
application of, or conclusion, of law and is reviewed by a correctness of error standard and
does not accord the district court any deference. Schweitzer v. Wasatch Manor, Inc. 871
P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994)
Review of the district court's denial of respondent's motion to substitute the personal
representative of the Estate of Robert Owens' more than 90 days after a suggestion of death
on the record, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. "Under rule 6 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the district court has the discretion to enlarge time after the time for doing
the act has expired, 'where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect,'" Stoddard
v. Smith, 27 P.3d 546, 551 (Utah 2001)
2. Cindy Young's Counter-petition Survived the Death of Robert Owens
The Lower Court held that the respondent's Amended Counter-petition To Modify
Decree of Divorce did not survive the death of the petitioner because his death extinguished
the divorce action. Under common law, and in states where statutes confer a continuing
jurisdiction to consider, and even modify, a decree of divorce at any time there is a material
change of circumstances, including after the death of one of the parties. This is particularly
true where the claim is for maintenance of minor children. The power to modify the decree
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as to child support, or the collection of child support, survives the death of the obligated
parent. (See, UCA § 30-3-5(3), 1953 as amended; 27 CJS Divorce § 719, p 360; Colombo
v. Walker Bank and Trust Company, 26 Utah 350, 489 P.2d ( 1971); Murphy v. Moyle, 17
Utah 113,53 P. 1010 (1898); Colombo & Murphy are probate actions, but both construe the
Utah Statute confer continuing jurisdiction on the district court to make adjustments to
divorce decrees where circumstances justify changes). See also Sandlin 's Administrator v.
Allen, 90 SW.2d350( Kentucky 1936); West v. West, 217 N.S. (Mich

) both enforcing

child support out of the estate of the deceased obligated parent. The Utah Supreme Court in
Colombo stated that the law announced inMurphy was good law under UCA 30-3-5 (1953).
They noted that the Court in Moyle so held because of the provision of the divorce decree
awarding child support. In Colombo, the Supreme Court considered the maintenance and
support of the child from funds available after the death of the father. The Supreme Court
in Colombo cited to other cases outside of Utah, California and Montana, in which the courts
had considered issues of child support after the death of the father.
In the Owens case the divorce was granted (1989), and the respondent's counterpetition asserted a cause of action that existed prior to the petitioner's death because of his
hiding of his employment and his failure to report his income and to pay child support in
accordance with the state child support guidelines. The cause of action arose out of the
misconduct of the petitioner while he was alive. It deprived the respondent of support to
which she was and is entitled under the law, and is like any other action for contract or
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damages or such claims that may be brought against an estate of a deceased party. As noted
above, actions against an estate of a divorced party have been, and are allowed in the State
of Utah.
The district court erred in holding that the respondent's counter-petition claim did
not survive the death of the petitioner, Robert Owens.
3. The Court for Excusable Neglect Can Extend the Time For Filing a Motion To
Substitute A Party After The Expiration of 90 days After Suggestion of Death
On Record.
"Under rule 6 ofthe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court has the discretion
to grant a motion to enlarge time after the time for doing the act has expired, 'where the
failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.' Stoddard v. Smith, 27 P. 3 d 546,5 51 (Utah
2001) Utah R, Civ. P. 6(b)(2)." Under Stoddard, the district court had the discretion to
enlarge the time for filing the motion to substitute, even though, the 90 day period under rule
25(a) had expired. The Utah position is supported by the federal cases construing rule 25(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which is word for word the same as Utah's rule
25(a). Continental Bank N.A. v. Meyer, 10 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir., 1993); Tatterson v.
Koppers, Co., 104 F.R.D. 19, 20 (W.D. Pa 1984)
In both Continental Bank and Tatterson the courts granted and or allowed the
substitution of a party in place of a deceased party after the 90 day period prescribed in Rule
25(a) had expired. In Tatterson the Court stated: "However, the history of Rule 25(a) and
Rule 6(b) makes it clear that the 90 day period was not intended to act as a bar to otherwise
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meritorious actions, and extensions of the period may be liberally granted." Tatters on v.
Koppers Co., Inc., supra, 104 F.R.D. 19, 20 (Citations ommitted)
". . . although it would have been preferable if Plaintiff s counsel had moved for an
enlargement of time during the 90 day period, this Court finds no bad faith in his
failure to do so. The motion for substitution was filed 17 days after David Tatterson's
appointment as executor. Because identity of the executor was uncertain until he was
duly confirmed by the Register of Wills, this Courtfindsno culpable conduct in the
failure of a legal representative tofilea motion for substitution prior to the expiration
of the 90 day time limit.." (Id @ 21)
In Stoddard v. Smith, supra, p. 451, the Court enumerated the following factors to
be weighed in determining whether excusable neglect was present: (1) whether the moving
party (respondent here) acted in good faith; (2) the danger of prejudice to the non-moving
party; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) the length of the delay and its potential impact on
judicial proceedings.
In the case at bar, the respondent/appellant, after inquiring and learning that the
personal representative named in the will would not attempt to probate the will, attempted
to have herself appointed personal representative of the Estate of Robert J. Owens on behalf
of her minor son, R. Jacob Owens. On October 24,2001, Cindy Youngfiledan Application
For Adjudication of Intestacy and Appointment As Personal Representative. On November
13,2001, Appellee, Kathy Lee Seich,filedan Objection to the Application. On November
28, 2001, Appellant Young filed a Verified Motion For a Restraining Order to prevent
dissipation of estate assets pending resolution of the Application. On December 13, 2001,
Seich responded to Young's motion. On December 20, 2001 the district court, the
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Honorable Judge, Roger Livingston, heard the Motion for a Restraining Order and the
responses thereto. After hearing the arguments and pursuant to stipulation of the parties,
Judge Livingston granted the temporary restraining order, but denied the Application to
appoint the appellant as personal representative. Instead, he appointed Kathy Lee Seich as
personal representative of the Estate of Robert J. Owens.
On April 4, 2002, the probate court entered the order appointing Kathy Lee Seich as
personal representative, and on April 24,2002, twenty days later, appellant filed her motion
to substitute Ms. Seich as a party to this action.
The appellant did all she could do to obtain the appointment of a personal
representative after the suggestion of death on the record in order to move for the substitution
of the personal representative as a party in this action.

When considering the factors

enumerated by Stoddard, her efforts establish her good faith in attempting to move this case
forward. When the motion was brought, it presented no danger of prejudice to the Appellee
that it would not have presented if brought within the required 90 days. Further, the
resistence of the Appellee to having a personal representative appointed in a timely manner
brought about and was the real cause of danger of prejudice, if any. The reason for the delay
was to have a personal representative appointed in which the Appellee did not cooperate, but
resisted and caused.

The reason on the part of the Appellant was both reasonable and

justifiable. The length of the delay was not unreasonable under the circumstances. The
circumstances establish excusable neglect and the basis upon which the Appellant failed to
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move for substitution in this case are far different and more justifiable than the reason
advanced in the Stoddard case, where the Court on appeal could not find excusable neglect.
There is no indication in the record that the district court considered the four factors
enumerated in Stoddard, in determining not to exercise its discretion. The court in essence
made no findings at all. The conduct and neglect here, if any, is equally as excusable as was
the conduct of the party which moved to substitute after the 90 day period in Tatterson. Had
counsel for the appellant moved to substitute the Estate or unnamed personal representative
of the Estate, or had appellant moved to extend the time for filing the motion, it would not
have caused a speedier resolution of the issues or changed the presentation of the case as a
whole. The matter could have not proceeded on its merits without the appointment of the
personal representative. Further, upon whom would the appellant have served the motion?
Had the appellant done those things, the litigation would not have been any further ahead in
the case than it was as things proceeded. There is abundant basis for excusable neglect on
the part of the appellant in not strictly complying with Rule 25(a). Her conduct well comes
within the construction and/or application of the rule announced by the Supreme Court in
Stoddard v. Smith, 27 P.3d 546, 551 supra, p. 18, and Tatterson v. Koppers Co., Inc., 104
F.R.D. 19, 20, supra, p. 19.
The trial judge did not resolve or make any factual findings in support of his ruling.
He apparently based his decision on the case law and rules. (AR 1954, App. P. 23) The
Appellant petitioner has not been prejudiced at all by the delay. The length of the delay was
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only about four months beyond the 90 day period and, but for this appeal, had or would have
had negligible, if any, affect on these proceedings. In any event, any delay was brought
about by the resistance of the named personal representative in the will, Kathy Seich, to
having the will probated and to being appointed as the personal representative of the Estate.
It is in the interest ofjustice and in keeping with the public policy and legal principles
that all actions be determined on their merits to construe Rule 25(a) flexibly where excusable
neglect is shown, and URCP 25(a) should be construed flexibly to allow a substitution under
the circumstances of this case. The district court abused its discretion in failing to grant
appellant's motion to substitute the personal representative as a party in this action.
4. The District Court Erred In Failing To Make Findings To Support Its Ruling.
The district court was required to make findings to support its ruling on the law.
Andersonv. Utah County Board Of County Commissioners, 589 P. 2d 1214 (Utah 1979) The
district court judge did not make any findings upon which to base its ruling. The Court
discussed the state of the record, noting that there had been considerable activity since the
filing of respondent's counter-petition. The court noted that the activity consisted mainly of
motions and not very much toward the prosecuting of the counter-petition. However, the
record will show that the last six months prior to the death of the petitioner was devoted
almost entirely to getting the case ready to try the Counter-petition.
On February 3, 2000, the respondent filed a motion to amend the counter petition.
Upon hearing, the Commissioner recommended the respondent be granted leave to do so.
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However, only after obstreperous resistence and objection to both the granting of leave, and
to the form of the order by counsel for the petitioner, on August 24, 2001, only five days
before the death of the petitioner, the court entered the order allowing the amendment to the
counter-petition.

Thereafter, Until April 4, 2002, the respondent was involved in a

probate action in an attempt to have a personal representative appointed to the estate of the
petitioner in order to substitute the estate in this action. Following the appointment of the
personal representative by the Third District Probate Court, the next four and a half months
was expended in attempting to have the Estate substituted as a party.
The court did not make any findings regarding the prosecutorial efforts of the
respondent, but appeared to make its decision, and rule that the case was extinguished and
should be dismissed, solely upon documented findings that the petitioner had passed away
and that a motion to substitute the estate as a party had not been made within 90 days of the
notice of petitioner's death filed in the record.

X. CONCLUSION
The district court erred in ruling that the death of the petitioner extinguished the case
and

the respondent's counterclaim for modification of the Decree of Divorce.

The

respondent demonstrated excusable neglect for not moving to substitute the personal
representative of the petitioner's estate within 90 days of the notice of his death on the record.
The court abused its discretion in not granting respondent's motion to substitute.
For the reasons stated above, this court should reverse the district court and remand
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with instructions to reinstate the action, and the appellant's counter-petition, and allow the
substitution of the personal representative of the Estate Of Robert Owens as a party to the
action.
Dated this^ d a y November, 2003.

lano S. Findlay
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant
<r~

XI APPENDIX
(Transcript of Hearing dated August 26, 2002 is attached)
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9 Exchange Place, Suite 801
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elano S. Findlay
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